Using a Microeconometric Model of Household Labour Supply to Design Optimal Income Taxes by Rolf Aaberge & Ugo Colombino
Using a Microeconometric Model of Household






© 2010 by RolfAaberge and Ugo Colombino.Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors
and not those of the Collegio CarloAlberto.1 
Using a Microeconometric Model of Household Labour Supply 
to Design Optimal Income Taxes 
Rolf Aaberge and Ugo Colombino 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to present an exercise where we identify optimal income tax rules according to 
various social welfare criteria, keeping fixed the total net tax revenue. Empirical applications of optimal 
taxation theory have typically adopted analytical expressions for the optimal taxes and then imputed numerical 
values to their parameters by using “calibration” procedures or previous econometric estimates. Besides the 
restrictiveness of the assumptions needed to obtain analytical solutions to the optimal taxation problem, a 
shortcoming of that procedure is the possible inconsistency between the theoretical assumptions and the 
assumptions implicit in the empirical evidence. In this paper we follow a different procedure, based on a 
computational approach to the optimal taxation problem. To this end, we estimate a microeconomic model 
with 78 parameters that capture heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences for singles and couples as 
well as in job opportunities across individuals based on detailed Norwegian household data for 1994. For any 
given tax rule, the estimated model can be used to simulate the labour supply choices made by single 
individuals and couples. Those choices are therefore generated by preferences and opportunities that vary 
across the decision units. We then identify optimal tax rules – within a class of 9-parameter piece-wise linear 
rules - by iteratively running the model until a given social welfare function attains its maximum under the 
constraint of keeping constant the total net tax revenue. The parameters to be determined are an exemption 
level, four marginal tax rates, three “kink points” and a lump sum transfer that can be positive (benefit) or 
negative (tax). We explore a variety of social welfare functions with differing degree of inequality aversion. 
All the social welfare functions imply monotonically increasing marginal tax rates. When compared with the 
current (1994) tax systems, the optimal rules imply a lower average tax rate. Moreover, all the optimal rules 
imply – with respect to the current rule – lower marginal rates on low and/or average income levels and higher 
marginal rates on relatively high income levels. These results are partially at odds with the tax reforms that 
took place in many countries during the last decades. While those reforms embodied the idea of lowering 
average tax rates, the way to implement it has typically consisted in reducing the top marginal rates. Our 
results instead suggest to lower average tax rates by reducing marginal rates on low and average income levels 
and increasing marginal rates on very high income levels. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of optimal taxation. The purpose is not new, but the exercise 
illustrated here differs in many important ways from previous attempts to empirically compute optimal 
taxes. The standard procedure adopted in the literature starts with some version of the optimal taxation 
framework originally set up in the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971). The next step typically consists 
of feeding with numbers – taken from some previous empirical analysis - the formulas produced by 
the theory. This literature is surveyed by Tuomala (1990). A recent strand of research adopts the same 
approach to address the inverse optimal taxation problem, i.e. retrieving the social welfare function 
that makes optimal a given tax rule (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005). There are two main problems 
with optimal taxation literature: 1) The theoretical results become amenable to an operational 
interpretation only by adopting some special assumptions concerning the preferences, the composition 
of the population and the structure of the tax rule; 2) The empirical measures used as counterparts of 
the theoretical concepts are usually derived from previous estimates obtained under assumptions that 
may be different from those used in the theoretical model. As a consequence the consistency between 
the theoretical model and the empirical measures is dubious and the significance of the numerical 
results remains uncertain. The typical outcome of these exercises envisages a lump-sum transfer which 
is progressively taxed away by very high marginal and decreasing tax rates on lower incomes (i.e. a 
negative income tax mechanism); beyond the “beak-even point” (i.e. the income level where the 
transfer is completely exhausted), the marginal tax rates become constant or slightly increasing. 
Recent papers by Tuomala (2006, 2008) show however that these results are essentially forced by the 
restrictive assumptions typically made upon preferences, elasticities and distribution of productivities 
(or wage rates). Interestingly, when Tuomala (2008) adopts a more flexible specification of the utility 
function he finds that the optimal system is progressive with monotonically increasing marginal tax 
rates. 
  While most of the studies mentioned above were essentially illustrative numerical exercises, 
several recent contributions have attempted to use optimal taxation results in the empirical evaluation 
or design of tax-transfer reforms. Saez (2001) makes Mirrlees’s results more easily interpretable by 
reformulating them in terms of labour (or income) supply elasticities in order to provide a more direct 
link between theoretical results and empirical measures.  Saez (2002) develops a model amenable to 
empirical implementation that focuses on the relative magnitude of the labour supply elasticities at the 
extensive and intensive margin.  Immervoll et al. (2007) adopt Saez’s model (2002) to evaluate 
alternative income support policies in European countries. Blundell et al. (2006) and Haan and 
Wrohlich (2007) also use Saez (2002) to evaluate taxes and transfers for lone mothers in Germany and 
UK,  whereas Kleven et al.(2007) provide results on the taxation of couples. Although these new 3 
contributions are interesting attempts to advance towards the empirical implementation of theoretical 
optimal taxation results, they still rely on very restrictive assumptions and moreover might suffer from 
a possible inconsistency between the theoretical model and the empirical measures used to implement 
it. For example, the model proposed by Saez (2002) does not account for income effects
1 and adopts 
restrictive assumptions upon  the way the households  respond to changes in the relative attractiveness 
of the opportunities in the budget set.
2 When it comes to empirical applications (as in Immervoll et al.  
(2007), Blundell et al. (2006) and Haan and Wrohlich (2007)), the parameters of the theoretical 
models are given numerical values estimated with empirical models that do not adopt the same 
restrictive assumptions of Saez (2002). Of course some of those limitations and potential 
inconsistencies might be overcome in the future, but it remains unlikely that analytical solutions of the 
optimal income taxation problem will ever be able to be fully consistent with flexible structural labour 
supply models.
3  To escape these problems we follow here a completely different approach. We do not 
start from theoretical results dictating conditions for optimal tax rules under various assumptions. 
Instead we use a microeconometric model of labour supply in order to identify by simulation the tax 
rule that maximizes a social welfare function under the constraints that the households maximize their 
own utility and total net tax revenue remains constant. The microeconometric simulation approach is 
common in evaluating tax reforms, but has not been much used in empirical optimal taxation studies.
4 
The closest examples adopting a similar approach are represented by Fortin, Truchon and Beauséjour 
(1993), Colombino et al. (2008), Colombino (2009) and Blundell and Shephard (2009). 
5 
The complex specification we adopt for representing preferences and opportunity sets does not permit 
an analytical solution of the maximization problems, which are therefore solved computationally. 
Obviously, the result of our computational exercise cannot claim the same generality of the analytical 
solution. While the latter establishes an explicit relationship between the fundamentals of the economy 
(preferences, skill distribution etc.), the former is application-specific (in this paper: Norway-specific): 
this is the price of accounting for a more detailed and flexible representation of the economy. In 
principle, however, this limitation of our computational exercise could be overcome: by performing 
                                                      
1 Income effects can be accounted for, as in Saez (2001), at the cost of notable analytical and computational complications. 
2 In Saez (2002) each individul can only choose among three opportunities: non-participation and two adjacent labour income 
brackets. 
3 This is not at all meant to diminish the value of theoretical work and analytical solutions, which are unsostitutable for the 
understanding the “grammar” of the problem and for suggesting promising directions of reform; our reservations concern 
their direct applicablity in empircal policy analysis. 
4 A recent survey of microsimulation analyses of tax systems is provided by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006). 
5 Fortin, Truchon and Beauséjour (1993) use a calibrated (not estimated) model with rather restrictive (Stone-Geary) 
preferences and focus on alternative income support schemes rather than on the whole tax rule. Colombino et al. (2008) and 
Colombino (2009) analyse basic income support mechanisms. Blundell and Shephard (2009) focus on single mothers. 4 
similar exercises on many different economies, one should again be able to identify – empirically – a 
“general” relationship between the fundamentals of the economy and the optimal income tax rule. 
    As explained in Section 2, the empirical labour supply model used in this study 
contains 78 parameters that capture the heterogeneity in preferences and opportunities among 
households and individuals. The estimated model is used to simulate the choices given a particular tax 
rule. Those choices are therefore generated by preferences and opportunities that vary across the 
decision units. However, since preferences are heterogeneous and some individuals live as singles 
whereas others form families and live together, when it comes to social evaluation it does not make 
sense to treat the estimated utility functions as comparable individual welfare functions. To solve the 
interpersonal comparability problem we adopt a method that consists of using a common utility 
function in order to produce interpersonally comparable individual welfare measures. The common 
utility function is justified as a normative standard where the social planner treats individuals 
symmetrically and it is only used to compute and compare the individual welfare levels that provide 
the basis for the social welfare evaluation of tax reforms; it is not used for simulating household 
behaviour (where instead the estimated individual utility functions are used). This procedure, which 
circumvents the problem of interpersonal comparability of heterogeneous preferences, is well-
established in the empirical public economics literature. It is proposed in Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980) and in Hammond (1991), and it forms the basis for the definition and measurement of a money-
metric measure of utility in King (1983) and in Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2004). Moreover, it 
has been applied for example by Fortin, Truchon and Beauséjour (1993), Colombino et al. (2008) and 
Colombino (2009). As a practical matter, an average of the estimated individual utility functions or an 
estimated utility function (individual welfare function) with common parameters (as in our case) is 
typically used. Note, however, that the procedure traditionally followed by large part of the theoretical 
and empirical literature consists in simply ignoring the interpersonal comparability problem, either 
because consumption-leisure preferences are assumed homogeneous or because heterogeneous utility 
functions are aggregated as if they were comparable.  
  The microeconometric model, the data used and the estimates are presented in Section 2.  
In order to illustrate the behavioural implications of the estimates, Section 3.1 reports wage and 
income elasticities of labour supply. Since the microeconometric model, once estimated, is then used 
for a rather ambitious purpose – i.e. simulating choices in view of identifying optimal tax rules – it is 
important to check its reliability, besides reporting standard tests on parameters estimates. Ultimately, 
the model should be judged in its ability to do the job it is built for, i.e. predicting the outcomes of 
policy changes. In Section 3.2 we therefore perform an out-of-sample prediction exercise. Namely, we 
use the model (estimated on 1994 data) to predict household-specific distributions of income in 5 
Norway in 2001. We then compare the predicted distributions to the observed ones. The prediction 
performance turns out to be very satisfactory. In Sections 4.1and 4.2 we introduce the measures of 
individual welfare that allow interpersonal comparisons. Section 4.3 defines the alternative rank-
dependent social welfare functions with varying degree of inequality-aversion that are used to 
aggregate the individual welfare levels. In Section 4.4 we explain the computational procedure used: 
we identify optimal tax-transfer schedules – within a class of 9-parameter piece-wise linear rules - by 
iteratively running the model until a given social welfare function attains its maximum under the 
constraint of keeping constant the total net tax revenue. The parameters to be determined are an 
exemption level, four marginal tax rates, three “kink points” and a lump-sum transfer that can be 
positive or negative. The resulting optimal rules are presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains the final 
comments.  
   
2. The modeling framework 
2.1. The microeconometric labour supply model 
The labour supply model used in this study can be considered as an extension of the standard 
multinomial logit model, and differs from the traditional models of labour supply in several respects.
 6 
First, it accounts for observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and choice constraints, 
which means that it is able to take into account the presence of quantity constraints in the market. 
Second, it includes both single person households and married or cohabiting couples making joint 
labour supply decisions. A proper model of the interaction between spouses in their labour supply 
decisions is important as most of the individuals are married or cohabiting. Third, by taking all the 
details of the tax system into account, the budget sets become complex and non-convex in certain 
intervals.  
  For expository simplicity we consider in this section only the behaviour of a single person 
household. The extension to couples is fully explained  in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3. In the model, 
agents choose among jobs characterized by the wage rate w, hours of work h and other characteristics. 
The problem solved by the agent looks like the following: 
                                                      
6 Examples of previous applications of this approach are found in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999, 2000). The modeling approach used in these studies differs from the standard labour supply 
models by characterizing behaviour in terms of a comparison between utility levels rather than between marginal variations 
of utility. These models are close to other recent contributions adopting a discrete choice approach such as Dickens and 
Lundberg (1993), Euwals and van Soest (1999), Flood, Hansen and Wahlberg (2004) and Labeaga, Oliver and Spadaro 
(2007).   6 
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where  
h =  hours of work,  
w =  the pre-tax wage rate,  
s = observed job characteristics (besides h and w), 
 
j = unobserved (by the analyst) job and/or household characteristics, 
I = the pre-tax non-labour income (exogenous),  
c= disposable income (income after tax), 
 f = tax rule that transforms pre-tax incomes (wh,I) into disposable income c,  
B= the set of all opportunities available to the household (including non-market opportunities, i.e. a 
“job” with  0 w =  and  0 h = ). 
  Agents can differ not only in their preferences and in their wage (as in the traditional model) 
but also in the number of available jobs of different types. Moreover, for the same agent, wage rates 
(unlike in the traditional model) can differ from job to job. Let  ( , , ) p h w s denote the density of 
available jobs of type ( , , ). h w s  By representing the choice set B by a probability density p we can for 
example allow for the fact that jobs with hours of work in a certain range are more or less likely to be 
found, possibly depending on agents’ characteristics; or for the fact that for different agents the 
relative number of market opportunities may differ. We assume that the utility function can be 
factorised as 
(2.2)  ( ) ( ) ( , ), , , ( , ), , ( ) e = U f wh I h s j v f wh I h s j , 
where v and e are respectively the systematic and the random component. The term e is a random 
taste-shifter that accounts for the effect on utility of all the characteristics of the household-job match 
observed by the household but not by us. Moreover, we assume that e  is i.i.d. according to Type III 
Extreme Value distribution. 
  Although the random utility specification (2.2) is by now rather common in labour supply 
analyses, its implications (in view of interpreting households’ behaviour and simulation results) have 
not been fully clarified in the applied literature. Let us write U(1) = v(1)ε(1) and U(2) = v(2)ε(2) to 
denote the utility attained respectively at job 1 and at job 2. Then it is easily seen that it may happen 
that job 1 is preferred to job 2, although the observed characteristics may make job 2 look more 7 
desirable than job 1. Namely, it may happen that U(1) > U(2) even though v(1) < v(2), simply because 
ε(1)/ε(2) > v(2)/v(1). As a specific consequence of this, it may happen that the household optimizes on 
a “flat” segment of the budget line. This could never happen in a standard model where utility only 
depends on income and leisure (which is the reason why in that kind of model one is typically forced 
to introduce “optimization errors” to rationalize the data). 
  We observe the chosen h , w and s. Therefore we can specify the probability that the agent 
chooses a job with observed characteristics (h,w,s). It can be shown that under the assumptions (2.1), 
(2.2) and extreme value distributed ε we can write the probability density function of a choice (h,w,s) 
as
7 
(2.3)   
( , , )
( ( , ), , ) ( , , )
( , , ) Pr ( ( , ), , ) max ( ( , ), , )
( ( , ), ) ( , , ) x y z B
B
v f wh I h s p h w s
h w s U f wh I h s U f xy I y z
v f xy I y p x y z dxdydz
j
Î
  º = =     ∫∫∫
. 
where  ( , ) p h w is the density of choice opportunities which can be interpreted as the relative frequency 
(in the choice set B) of opportunities with hours h and wage rate w. Opportunities with  0 = h (and 
0 = w ) are non-market opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations of "leisure"). Thus, the density (2.3), 
which will form the basis of estimating the parameters of the utility function and the choice sets, can 
be considered to be analogous to the labour supply function of the Hausman approach. The density 
(2.3) is the contribution of an observation (h, w,s) to the likelihood function, which is then maximized 
in order to estimate the parameters of  ( ( , ), , ) v f hw I h s and of  ( , , ) p h w s . The intuition behind 
expression (2.3) is that the probability of a choice (h,w,s) can be expressed as the relative 
attractiveness – weighted by a measure of “availability”  ( , , ) p h w s – of jobs of type (h,w,s). From (2.3) 
we also see that this approach does not suffer from the complexity of the tax rule f. The tax rule, 
however complex, enters the expression as it is, and there is no need to simplify it in order to make it 
differentiable or manageable as in the traditional approach. The crucial difference is that in the 
traditional approach the functions representing household behavior are derived on the basis of a 
comparison of marginal variations of utility, while in the approach that we follow a comparison of 
levels of utility is directly involved.  
  In practice, the estimation adopts a discretised version of (2.3). Let  ( , ) q h w be some known 
joint density function (e.g. empirically fitted to the observations on h and w). Let us represent the 
latent choice set B with a sample R containing M points, where one is the chosen (observed) point and 
                                                       
7 For the derivation of the choice density (2.3), see Aaberge et al. (1999). Note that (2.3) can be considered as a special case 
of the more general multinomial type of framework developed by Dagsvik (1994). A more specialized type of continuous 
multinomial logit was introduced by Ben-Akiva and Watanatada (1981). 8 
the other M-1 are sampled from  ( , ) q h w . It can be shown (McFadden 1978; Ben Akiva and Lerman 
1985) that consistent estimates of  ( ( , ), ) v f wh I h  and  ( , ) p h w can still be obtained when (2.3) is 
replaced by 
(2.4)
( , , )
( , , )
( ( , ), , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) Pr ( ( , ), , ) max ( ( , ), , )
( ( , ), , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
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x y z R
x y z R
v f wh I h s p h w s q h w s
h w s U f wh I h s U f xy I y z
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In what follows we still call this the "continuous" model, since the opportunities contained in the latent 
choice set B are described by continuous density functions, although in the estimation procedure the 
choice set is given a discrete representation as in (2.4).    
  By specifying the probability density function  ( , , ) p h w s  on B we can for example allow for 
the fact that jobs with hours of work in a certain range are more or less likely to be found, possibly 
depending on agents' characteristics; or for the fact that for different agents the relative number of 
market opportunities may differ. From expression (2.3) it is clear that what we adopt is a choice 
model, where choice, however, is constrained by the number and the characteristics of jobs in the 
opportunity set. Therefore the model is also compatible with the case of involuntary unemployment, 
i.e. an opportunity set that does not contain any market opportunity. Besides this extreme case, the 
number and the characteristics of market (and non-market) opportunities in general vary from 
individual to individual. Even if the set of market opportunities is not empty, in some cases it might 
contain very few elements and/or elements with bad characteristics. To proceed with estimation one 
has to specify the functional form of the deterministic part of the utility function, i.e. the functional 
form of the systematic component v of the utility function and the opportunity density p(h,w). 
 
2.2. Empirical specification of the choice sets and the utility function 
Although the above framework allows any sector-division of the labor market we will in this study 
focus on the private-public division. This choice is motivated by the fact that the private-public 
division emerges as the basic division in labor economics. Moreover, a further division of the labor 
market would have increased the total number of parameters to be estimated above the critical level 
determined by the given number of observations.  
2.2.1. Specification of choice sets 
The individuals maximize their utility by choosing among opportunities defined by hours of work, 
hourly wage and sector of employment. Opportunities with  0 h = (and  0 w = ) are non-market 9 
opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations of "leisure"). In the specification of the probability density of 
opportunities we will assume that offered hours and offered wages are independently distributed and 
may differ across sectors. The justification for this is that offered hours, in particular normal working 
hours, are typically set in rather infrequent negotiations between employers and employees 
associations, while wage negotiations are far more frequent in which the hourly wage tend to be set 
independent of working hours. Offered hours are assumed to be uniformly distributed, except for 
hours related to full-time jobs and a specific type of part-time jobs (18-20 weekly hours). Thus, this 
opportunity density for offered hours implies that it is far more likely to find jobs with hours that 
accord with a full-time position and specific part-time positions than jobs with other working loads. 
Accordingly, we specify the density of opportunities in sector s requiring h hours of work and paying 
hourly wage w as 
(2.5)  ( )
0 1 2 3
0
( ) ( ) ( ) if 0
, ,
1 if 0
s s p g h g w g s h
p h w s
p h
> 
=  - = 
       
where p0 is the proportion of market opportunities in the opportunity set, g1s, g2s and g3, are 
respectively the densities of hours, wages, and opportunities in sector s, conditional upon the 
opportunity being a market job and s = 1 if the job belongs to the public sector and s = 0 if the job 
belongs to the private sector
8. Except for possible peaks corresponding to part time (pt, 18-20 weekly 
hours) and to full time (ft, 37-40 weekly hours) we assume that the distribution of offered annual hours 
is uniformly distributed. Thus, g1 is given by 
(2.6) 
( ]
( ) ( ]
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Since the density values must add up to 1, we can also compute  s g  according to 
                                                      
8 By using a more general specification for the opportunity density defined by (2.5) the estimates of the coefficients that 
accounted for a possible interaction between the wage rates and offered hours of work were not found to be statistical 
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For the purpose of empirical specification it appears convenient to introduce the following 
transformation of p0 










We also specify 
(2.9)  ( ) 0 3 0 1 2 ( ) exp (1 ) g g s s s m m m = + + - . 
The above parameters p  and m  vary by gender. In the tables we refer to p  and m  as the parameters 
of the job opportunity density. 
  The density of offered wages is assumed to be lognormal with mean that depends on length 
of schooling (Ed) and on past potential working experience (Exp), where experience is defined to be 
equal to age minus length of schooling minus five, i.e. 
(2.10) 
2
0 1 2 3 logw Exp Exp Ed b b b b sh = + + + +  
where h is standard normally distributed. The parameters b  vary by gender and sector of 
employment. 
  The hours densities and the wage densities are the same for married/cohabitating females and 
males as specified for single females and males. The same applies to  0 3( ) M M g g s  and  0 3( ) F F g g s . 
Moreover, we have 
 
(2.11)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 3 3 0 1 2 1 2 ( ) ( ) exp 1 1 MF M F M M M M F F F F g g s g s s s s s m m m m m = + + - + + - . 
 
In this case the households choose among opportunities defined by a vector ( ) , , , , , M F M F M F h h w w s s . 
Here  1 k s =  if the partner of gender k is employed in the public sector, with k = M, F. Analogously to 
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For the purpose of empirical specification and estimation it is convenient to divide the density  ( ) p by 
( )( ) 0 0 1 1 M F p p - - and define 
 









































2.2.2. Specification of utility function for single females and males 
Let  ( ) , f wh I  be disposable income (income after tax) measured in 100 000 NOK.   
The systematic part is specified as follows 
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L is leisure, defined as  ( ) 1 8736 L h = - , A is age, C1, C2, and C3 are number of children below 3, 
between 3 and 6 and between 7 and 14 years old, respectively.   The a-parameters are gender-
specific.  The children terms are dropped in the utility function for single males since we observe very 
few children living with single males. 
  Note that the flexible functional form of the utility function allows for a labor supply that is 
backward bending. The latter means that the higher the wage rate is, the less the labour supply will be. 
If so, the income effects dominate over the substitution effects. In fact, the functional form 12 
specification allows for the responses on wage rate to vary a lot across individuals, depending on their 
economic situation (the magnitude of w and I). The functional form can also yield a linear labour 
supply curve. As mentioned above this is the only form that the Hausman approach applies. The 
problem with a linear labour supply curve in the wage rate is that by assumption the labour supply 
elasticity tends to increase with the wage rate. The linearity assumption thus imply that the higher 
skilled, with high wage rates, are more responsive than those with lower skills, and hence lower wage 
rates
9.  
  Given the above assumption upon the stochastic component and upon the density of 
opportunities, it turns out that the probability (density) that an opportunity ( ) , , h w s is chosen is 
(2.15) 
0,1
( , , ) ( , , )
( , , )
( , , ) ( , , )
s
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In view of the empirical specification it is convenient to divide both numerator and denominator by 
0 1 p - . Inserting for (2.5) and (2.8) in (2.15) can then rewrite the choice density as follows, 
(2.16) 
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for { } , 0 h w >  and 
(2.17) 
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for { } , 0 h w = . Note that the sector variable s vanishes and is replaced by the symbol × for the non-
market alternatives ({ } , 0 h w =  ). 
2.2.3. Specification of the utility function for couples 
The labour supply model for married couples accounts for both spouses’ decisions through the 
following specification of the systematic part of the utility function for couples 
                                                      
9 See Røed and Strøm (2002) for a further discussion. 13 
(2.18)
( )







4 5 6 7 8 1 9 2 10 3 11 1 12 2 13 3
14
2
15 16 17 18 19 1 20 2 21 3 22 1 23 2 24
( , , ) 1




F F M F
M F M F M F
F
F F F F F F
M M M M M M
f h w h w I
v h h w w s s
L
A A s C C C s C s C s C





a a a a a a a a a a
a





+ + + + + + + + + +  
 























   - -
+   
   
 where the leisure Li  is defined as  ( ) 1 8736 , , i i L h i F M = - = . Moreover, we allow for sector- and 
gender-specific job opportunities in accordance with the functional forms (2.12) and (2.13), which 




( ) 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 , , , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , , , ,
M M F F M F M F M F MF s M s M M s F s F F
M F M F M F
v h h w w s s g g h g w g s g h g w g s
h h w w s s
D
j =
if both spouses work; 
(2.20) ( )
( ) 0 1 2 3 ,0, ,0, , ( ) ( ) ( )
,0, ,0, ,
M M M M M M s M s M M
M M M





× =   if only the husband 
works; 
(2.21) ( )
( ) 0 1 2 3 0, ,0, , , ( ) ( ) ( )
0, ,0, , ,
F F F F F F s F s F F
F F F





× =   if only the wife works; 


























1 2 1 2
0,0,0,0, ,
,0, ,0, , ( ) ( ) ( )
0, ,0, , , ( ) ( ) ( )






M M M M M M M M M
x
y
F F F F F F F F F
x
y









v x y s g g x g y g s dx dy
v x y s g g x g y g s dx dy





















3 ( ) ( )
M F
F F F M F M M s
s s
y g s dx dy dx dy
= = ∑ ∑ ∫∫∫
 14 
2.3. Data and estimation 
2.3.1. Data 
The estimation of the 78 parameters of the model is based on data from the 1995 Norwegian Survey of 
Level of Living, which includes detailed income data from tax reported records. We have restricted 
the ages of the individuals to be between 20 and 62 in order to minimize the inclusion in the sample of 
individuals who in principle are eligible for retirement, since analysis of retirement decisions is 
beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, self-employed as well as individuals receiving permanent 
disability benefits are excluded from the sample. Table 2.1 reports incomes, participation rates and 
hours of work observed for the sample based on data for 1842 couples, 309 single females and 312 
single males. 
 







Annual hours  Household income, NOK 1994 
Given participation  In the total population 
Gross income  Taxes  Disposable 
income  M  F  M  F  M  F 
 
 
Single males (M) 
 
I  69    1285    886    85922  14144  71778 
II  86    1343    1157    105799  18281  87518 
III-VIII  95    2041    1936    189772  46930  142842 
IX  97    2304    2225    309909  94218  215691 
X  76    2684    2036    466720  159738  306982 
All  90    1999    1793    210626  56762  153864 
 
 
Single females (F) 
 
I    66    1128    739  85309  11099  74210 
II    76    1362    1033  107709  14877  92832 
III-VIII    87    1801    1564  179199  38759  140441 
IX    93    2118    1972  265653  63411  202243 
X    97    2743    2649  324394  78749  245645 





I  75  59  1459  1111  1090  655  191006  33005  158001 
II  79  79  1641  1245  1293  988  259226  51660  207566 
III-VIII  92  86  2029  1524  1870  1316  400954  103150  297804 
IX  95  92  2406  1751  2285  1604  584018  176183  407835 
X  86  81  2583  1737  2220  1415  833657  260049  573608 
All  89  83  2041  1514  1811  1256  427342  113973  313368 
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2.3.2. Estimation 
  The parameters appearing in expressions (2.13) are gender-specific and thus estimated 
separately for single females and males. The likelihood functions are equal to the products of the 
individual-specific labor supply densities for couples defined by (2.19) – (2.23) and single females and 
single males defined by (2.16) – (2.17). The estimation is based on a procedure suggested by McFadden 
(1978) which yields results that are close to the full information maximum likelihood method. The 
method essentially consists in representing the true opportunity set with a sample of weighted alternatives, 
with the weights depending on the sample scheme. As a first step we estimate the required gender-specific 
q-functions of equation (2.4). We then draw 199 values from these densities and build 200 alternatives 
(adding the observed choice) for each household. In other words, the continuous logit model is replaced 
by a discrete logit version. McFadden has demonstrated that this method yields consistent and 
asymptotically normal parameter estimates. We found the McFadden estimation procedure to be 
remarkably efficient. Our experience suggest that even choice sets of 50 random points (draws in R
4) 
produce results which are close to the one obtained by the 200 random point sets.  
  The estimates of opportunity density parameters are reported in Table 2.2. The estimates of 
the preference parameters for single females and males are reported in Table 2.3. whereas the 
estimates of the preference parameters for couples are reported in Table 2.4. Overall the parameters are 
measured quite precisely and their signs are consistently with economic reasoning. As can be seen from 
Table 2.2 there is a weak tendency of clustering in the opportunity density of full-time jobs for both males 
and females and moreover of the specific part-time jobs for females. However, this means that jobs with 
full-time hours is less dominating than in the previous decades and confirm the claim from OECD 
Employment Outlook for 1997 that the Norwegian labour market is among the most flexible of the OECD 
countries.  The estimated wage distributions show that the return from one additional year of education is 
higher in the private than in the public sector for males as well as for females. 
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Table 2.2. Job, Hours and Wage densities, Norway 1994 
  Parameter  Females  Males 
  Estimate  Std. Dev.  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
Job opportunity 
 0  -2.10  (0.18)  -3.17  (0.23) 
µ1  -1.51  (0.18)  -2.68  (0.20) 
µ2  1.39  (0.17)  1.39  (0.17) 
Hours 
π1  0.49  (0.13)  -0.50  (0.22) 
2 p   -0.23  (0.23)  0.09  (0.51) 
3 p  
1.47  (0.09)  1.81  (0.07) 
4 p  
0.03  (0.14)  0.06  (0.13) 
Wage – Private sector 
0 b  
3.62  (0.07)  3.50  (0.06) 
1 b  
2.60  (0.30)  2.83  (0.31) 
2 b  
-4.04  (0.64)  -4.41  (0.64) 
3 b  
3.93  (0.50)  5.38  (0.41) 
s   0.24  (0.00)  0.28  (0.01) 
Wage - Public sector 
0 b  
3.71  (0.08)  3.62  (0.09) 
1 b  
2.14  (0.33)  2.46  (0.44) 
2 b  
-3.37  (0.71)  -3.82  (0.91) 
3 b  
3.59  (0.46)  4.95  (0.47) 
s   0.18  (0.01)  0.22  0.01 
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Note that the signs of the preference parameter estimates for single and married/cohabitating females 
and males displayed in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are consistent with economic theory. A main finding is that 
the leisure of married/cohabitating women, i.e. time spent on doing all kind of domestic work and pure 
leisure, increases with the number of small children in the household. Moreover, leisure appears to be 
more important for married/cohabitating females working in the public sector, in particular for those 
with children between 3 and 6 year old. The latter effect may be due to the flexibility in hours of work 
arrangements in the public sector
10. The marginal utility of leisure for the married female is also 
typically a convex function of age, which implies that after she has reached around 35 years of age, 
marginal utility of leisure is increasing with age. Thus, when she is young and raises small children 
her supply of labour outside the home is negatively affected. When the period of having small children 
is over, then the age effect – like for men- starts to creep in and weakens the incentive to supply 
labour. Now we will turn to a discussion of how labour supply responds to changes in economic 
incentives. In the next section this will be done in terms of wage elasticities. 
 
Table 2.3. Estimates of the parameters of the utility functions for single females and males. 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter 
Single females  Single males 
Estimate  Std. Dev.  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
Consumption           
  a1  -0.59  0.28  0.24   0.33 
  a2  4.37  0.52  2.27   0.44 
Leisure           
  a3  0.65  0.92  0.76   0.99 
  a4  498.50  145.18  337.40   128.84 
Log age  a5  -265.77  79.22  -180.89   70.63 
Log age squared  a6  36.36  10.89  24.81   9.75 
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a7  3.62  2.43     
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a8  -0.36  7.87     
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a9  -2.24  1.42     
Employed in public sector   a10  -2.97  0.87  -2.20  0.90 
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child.,  
0 – 2 years old)   a11  -7.29  7.46     
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child.,  
3 – 6 years old)  a12  -1.02  2.10     
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child.,  
7 – 14 years old)  a13  1.15  1.10     
 
 
                                                      
10 Statistics Norway has, for example, more than 90 different hours of work arrangement. On top of that, many employees are 
allowed to spend up to three days of work in their home office. 18 
Table 2.4. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function for married/cohabitating couples. 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
Consumption           
  a1  0.14     (0.09)   
  a2  6.49     (0.43)   
Wife’s leisure           
  a3  -3.81     (0.43)   
  a4  194.89     (28.53)   
Log age  a5  -107.09    (15.88)   
Log age squared  a6  15.14     (2.23)   
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a7  0.34     (0.31)   
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a8  1.31     (0.31)   
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a9  1.70     (0.26)   
Employed in public sector   a10  -0.95    (0.30)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 0 – 2 years old)   a11  0.40    (0.33)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 3 – 6 years old)  a12  0.39    (0.32)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 7 – 14 years old)  a13  -0.97    (0.24)   
Husband’s leisure           
  a14  -1.01    (039)   
  a15  222.99    (41.03)   
Log age  a16  -116.55    (22.34)   
Log age squared  a17  15.85    (3.06)   
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a18  -0.08    (0.40)   
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a19  -0.30    (0.35)   
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a20  -0.15    (0.25)   
Employed in public sector   a21  -0.60    (0.51)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 0 – 2 years old)   a22  -0.16    (0.39)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 3 – 6 years old)  a23  -0.93    (0.31)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 7 – 14 years old)  a24  -0.16    (0.25)   
Leisure interaction between spouses  a25  4.84    (1.12)   
*) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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3. Behavioural implications 
In this section we explore the behavioural implication of the estimates. First, we report wage and 
income elasticities of labour supply because they are useful for the understanding and the 
interpretation of the optimal taxation results that will be presented in Section 5. Second, since the 
model will be used for a rather ambitious operation (computing optimal tax-transfer rules) we illustrate 
the prediction performance of the model with an out-of-sample exercise. 
3.1 Elasticities  
  The wage elasticities are computed by means of stochastic simulation. Wage rates are 
incremented by 1 percent. Draws are made from the distributions related to preferences and 
opportunities. Given the responses of each individual, we aggregate them to compute the aggregate 
elasticities. Table 3.1 displays these elasticities. Since many individuals in this labour supply model of 
discrete choice will not react to small exogenous changes, the elasticities in Table 3.1 have been 
computed as an average of the percentage changes in labour supply from a 10 percent increase in the 
wage rates. By exact aggregation we find that the overall wage elasticity is equal to 0.12, which 
suggests rather low behavioural responses from wage and tax changes. At least, this would be the case 
if we used a representative agent model with wage elasticity equal to 0.12. However, by looking 
behind the aggregate elasticity the picture, as demonstrated by Table 3.1, changes substantially. Note 
that the third and the sixth panel of Table 3.1 give the unconditional elasticities of labour supply, 
which means that both the impact on participation and hours supplied is accounted for.  
In principle, elasticities such as those illustrated above might be used to compute optimal tax-transfer 
rules, e.g. by following the line developed – among others - by Diamond (1988), Saez (2001), Saez 
(2002), Blundell et al. (2006) and Kleven et al. (2007). As we explained in Section 1, we think that 
this procedure is not totally satisfactory, due to the possible inconsistency between the assumptions 
adopted by the theoretical optimal taxation model and the assumptions adopted in producing the 
empirical evidence. Our microeconometric estimates are based on assumptions that are much more 
flexible and general than those leading to the theoretical results for example of Diamond (1988) and 
Saez (2001, 2002). We follow a different approach and obtain the optimal tax-transfer rule 
computationally, i.e. we iteratively run the microeconometric model of household behaviour until the 
social welfare function is maximized under the constraint of total tax revenue.   
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Table 3.1. Labour supply elasticities with respect to wage for single females, single males, 
married females and married males by deciles of household disposable income*. Norway 1994 
Family status  Type of elasticity    Female elasticities  Male elasticities 
Income decile 










Single females and 
males 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
I  0.59    0.00   
II  0.45    0.00   
III-VIII  0.06    0.06   
IX  0.00    0.00   
X  0.00    0.00   
All  0.12    0.04   
Elasticity of the 
conditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
I  -0.17    0.77   
II  -0.04    0.00   
III-VIII  -0.08    -0.08   
IX  -0.07    0.00   
X  0.00    0.00   
All  -0.09    -0.02   
Elasticity of the 
unconditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
I  0.42    0.77   
II  0.42    0.00   
III-VIII  -0.02    -0.02   
IX  -0.07    0.00   
X  0.00    0.00   
All  0.02    0.02   
Married/cohabitating 
females and males 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
I  1.03  -0.28  0.90  -0.23 
II  0.35  -0.14  0.79  0.00 
III-VIII  0.14  -0.23  0.13  -0.10 
IX  0.12  -0.12  0.06  -0.06 
X  0.07  0.00  0.06  -0.19 
All  0.21  -0.19  0.23  -0.11 
Elasticity of the 
conditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
I  1.51  -0.01  0.87  0.11 
II  0.62  -0.53  0.38  -0.08 
III-VIII  0.27  -0.24  0.18  -0.14 
IX  0.08  -0.22  0.02  -0.09 
X  0.19  -0.10  -0.02  -0.23 
All  0.31  -0.25  0.16  -0.13 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
I  2.54  -0.29  1.77  -0.12 
II  0.97  -0.67  1.17  -0.08 
III-VIII  0.41  -0.47  0.31  -0.24 
IX  0.20  -0.34  0.08  -0.14 
X  0.26  -0.10  0.05  -0.42 
All  0.52  -0.42  0.39  -0.23 
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  Table 3.1 demonstrates that all own wage elasticities of married females and married males 
(except for the upper decile) are positive, whereas single females and males located in the central part 
of the income distribution exhibit a weakly negative response to a wage increase, due to the 
prevalence of the income effect. Second, we observe that almost all cross wage elasticities are 
negative. Thus, an increase in, say, the wage rate for males implies that the labour supply of his spouse 
goes down. The negative cross wage elasticities mean that an overall wage increase gives far weaker 
impact on labour supply, both for males and females, than partial wage increases for the two genders. 
For couples belonging to the ninth decile of the couples' income distribution this counteracting effect 
is so strong that labour supply of these couples’ declines from an overall wage increase. From each of 
the panels of Table 3.1 we observe that the labour supply of the 10-20 percent poorest are far more 
responsive to changes in economic incentives than the 10-20 percent richest. For single females and 
males in the 3-8 deciles of their corresponding income distributions we observe backward bending 
labour supply curves as income effects dominate over substitution effects. By comparing the fourth 
and fifth panel of Table 3.1 we see for married/cohabitating females that hours supplied (given 
participation), in particular for those belonging to the poorest couples, is by far more responsive than 
participation. This result reflects the flexibility of the Norwegian labour market, where jobs with part-
time working hours are rather common. Moreover, generous maternity leave arrangements and high 
coverage of subsidized kindergartens makes it attractive for women to combine raising children and 
participating in the labour market. By contrast, for single females we find that participation increases 
when wages increase, whereas hours supplied (given participation) decrease.  
The major feature of the estimated labour supply elasticities can be summarized as follows: (a) labour 
supply of married women is far more elastic than for married men; (b) individuals belonging to low-
income households are much more elastic than individuals belonging to high-income households. As 
demonstrated by the review of Røed and Strøm (2002) these findings are consistent with the findings 
in many recent studies. In order to complement the information provided by the wage elasticities 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 display information for income elasticities. Non-labour income comprehends 
several categories. Table 3.2 shows how the elasticity of labour supply varies with respect to changes 
in these income categories and how it depends on gender, household type and location in the income 
distribution.  
 22 
Table. 3.2.  Labour supply elasticities with respect to non-labour income for single females, 
single males, married females and married males by deciles of household disposable 
income. Norway 1994 
Family status  Type of elasticity 
  Female elasticities  Male elasticities 
Income 
decile under 























Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
I  -0.59  0.59  -0.59  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0  0  0 
III-VIII  -0.71  -0.13  -0.64  -0.12  -0.12  -0.06 
IX  -1.38  -0.34  -1.38  -0.33  0  -0.33 
X  -1.33  -1.00  -1.00  -0.83  -0.83  0 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
I  0.43  -0.16  0.43  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0  0  0 
III-VIII  0.08  0.02  0.09  0.05  0.05  0.05 
IX  -0.21  -0.04  -0.21  0.05  0  0.05 
X  -0.51  0.16  -0.47  -0.42  0.01  -0.40 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
I  -0.18  0.42  -0.18  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0  0  0 
III-VIII  -0.63  -0.11  -0.56  -0.07  -0.07  -0.01 
IX  -1.56  -0.22  -1.42  -0.29  0  -0.29 




Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
I  0  0  0  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0.07  0.14  0.07 
III-VIII  -0.16  -0-06  -0.11  -0.17  -0.17  -0.10 
IX  -0.23  -0.12  0  -0.46  -0.29  -0.17 
X  -0.81  -0.54  -0.27  -0.82  -0.57  -0.25 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
I  0  0  0  0  0  0 
II  -0.05  -0.10  -0.10  -0.08  0.01  -0.12 
III-VIII  -0.05  0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0  -0.03 
IX  -0.14  -0.06  0  -0.01  -0.01  0.03 
X  -0.22  -0.22  0.10  -0.32  -0.13  -0.13 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
I  0  0  0  0  0  0 
II  -0.05  -010  -0.10  -0.01  0.16  -0.04 
III-VIII  -0.21  -0.05  -0.13  -0.20  -0.07  -0.13 
IX  -0.37  -0.18  0  -0.47  -0.30  -0.14 
X  -1.01  -0.75  -0.17  -1.11  -0.69  -0.38 
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Table 3.3. Aggregate labour supply elasticities with respect to non-labour income for single and 
married individuals. Norway 1994 
Family 
status  Type of elasticity 
Female elasticities  Male elasticities 
Non-labour 
income (cap. 



















Elasticity of the probability of 
participation  -0.79  -0.20  -0.71  -0.19  0  -0.08 
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply of hours  -0.09  -0.03  -0.06  -0.05  -0.15  -0.02 
Elasticity of the unconditional 




Elasticity of the probability of 
participation 
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply of hours 
-0.20  -0.11  -0.09  -0.23  -0.12  -0.10 
           
-0.09  -0.04  -0.02  -0.10  -0.04  -0.05 
Elasticity of the unconditional 
expectation of total supply of hours  -0.30  -0.15  -0.11  -0.32  -0.16  -0.15 
 
3.2. Prediction performance of the microeconometric model 
This section illustrates the prediction performance of the model used for identifying the optimal 
tax rules. We present two exercises: prediction (“within-sample”) of the outcomes under the current 
(1994) tax regime and prediction (“out-of-sample”) of outcomes under the 2001 tax regime. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.6 describe some of the characteristics of the 1994 and 2001 tax regimes. 
Disposable income is the variable used for comparing predicted outcomes to observed outcomes. 
The predictions are obtained individual by individual, evaluating the utility function – including the 
stochastic component drawn from the Type I extreme value distribution – at each alternative and 
identifying the selected alternative as the one with the highest utility level. The individual predictions 
are then aggregated into the 10 means of the 10 income deciles. 
Table 4.1 provides the results of the exercise under the 1994 tax regime. For each of the 10 income 
deciles, we report the observed and the simulated average values of disposable income relative to the 
sample average. For example “90” means 90% of the sample average. This is just a “test” of the ability 
to reproduce the observed income distribution. Instead Table 3.5 reports the results of the more 
requiring out-of-sample prediction exercise. In this second exercise we use the model estimated on 
1994 data and the data (exogenous variables) from the Norwegian Survey of Level of Living in 2002, 
in order to predict the choices made in 2002 under the new tax rules introduced in 2001. In both 
exercises the model turns out to be rather successful in reproducing the income distributions.  24 
 
Table 3.4. Observed and predicted relative distributions of disposable income in 1994. Mean 
decile incomes in percent of mean income
Deciles  Couples  Single females  Single males 
Observed  Simulated  Observed  Simulated  Observed  Simulated 
1  52  51  49  51  46  47 
2  69  66  64  63  59  57 
3  77  75  76  73  69  68 
4  84  84  85  81  79  76 
5  90  91  94  92  86  86 
6  96  98  101  100  95  96 
7  104  106  111  110  104  109 
8  112  116  122  122  115  121 
9  125  129  134  139  138  141 
10  199  184  163  169  208  200 
 
 
Table 3.5. Observed and predicted relative distributions of disposable income in 2001. Mean 
decile income in percent of mean income 
Deciles  Couples  Single females  Single males 
Observed  Simulated  Observed  Simulated  Observed  Simulated 
1  50  49  45  47  41  42 
2  68  64  56  61  54  55 
3  77  74  68  71  65  67 
4  83  83  79  79  76  76 
5  89  90  90  88  87  86 
6  95  98  101  98  97  97 
7  102  107  111  108  107  108 
8  111  117  123  121  119  121 
9  125  131  139  138  137  141 
10  199  187  189  188  218  207 
9  129  128  142  136  150  135 
10  159  151  177  166  178  161 
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Table 3.6. The 2001 tax function for singles without children and couples without children and 
with two wage earners. NOK 2001 
Earnings(Y)  Tax 
[0 – 22200)  0 
[22200 – 32267)  0.25Y – 5550 
[32267 – 60600)  0.078Y 
[60600 – 144545)  0.358Y – 16968 
[144545 – 183182)  0.296Y – 8064 
[183182 – 289000)  0.358×Y – 19 348 
[289000 – 793200)  0.493×Y – 58 363 
[793200 – )  0.553×Y – 105 955 
 
 
4. The design of optimal income taxes 
 
4.1. The framework of the social planner 
  A social planner normally faces an efficiency-equality trade-off when he/she evaluates 
alternative designs of the tax-benefit system. This is due to the fact that income taxes create distortion 
of the incentives and moreover that the extent of the distortions might depend on the design of the tax 
system, although we restrict to tax systems that collect the same tax revenue.  To deal with the 
efficiency-equality trade-off, the literature on optimal taxation relies on social welfare functions 
defined as summary measures of the distribution of individual utilities of consumption and leisure, 
where utilities are assumed to be interpersonal comparable. The latter assumption is uncontroversial 
when one imposes the consumption-leisure preferences to be homogeneous, which by the way is 
common in the theoretical optimal tax literature. However, since the microeconomic labour supply 
model used in this study allows heterogeneous preferences for leisure and consumption and moreover 
some individuals live as singles whereas others live in a couple, it does not make sense to treat the 
estimated utility functions as comparable individual welfare functions. Thus, it is necessary to 
introduce measures of individual welfare that permit interpersonal comparisons.
 11 Section 4.2 explains 
the method used for dealing with this problem, whereas in Section 4.3 we discuss the methods that 
                                                      
11 See Boadway et al. (2002) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) for a discussion of interpersonal comparability of utility 
when preferences for leisure differ between individuals. 
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will be used for aggregating individual welfare levels into a social welfare function. Section 4.4 
explains the computational procedure used to determine the optimal tax-transfer schedules. 
 
4.2. Individual welfare functions 
A social planner wants to compare gains in welfare of some households to losses in welfare of other 
households as part of the evaluation of a tax reform. Unless one is prepared to assert that 
heterogeneous consumption-leisure preferences are comparable, one has somehow to solve the 
interpersonal comparability problem. In the context of empirical applications, there is only one type of 
solution convincingly elaborated in the literature, consisting in using a common utility function to 
evaluate the bundles chosen by households according to their own preferences. This approach is 
advocated, among others, by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), King (1983) and Hammond (1991). 
There are different versions, differing essentially in the way the common utility is specified. The 
common utility function is to be determined by the social planner based on her/his ethical judgements, 
and contains within it interpersonal comparability of both welfare levels and welfare differences. The 
common utility function (individual welfare function) V is to be interpreted just as the input of a social 
welfare function. It is not used to simulate behaviour; it is only used to evaluate – in a comparable way 
– the results of choices made according to the actual individual utility functions. The different roles 
played by the actual utility function U and the individual welfare function V are also explained in 
Section 5 where we specify the various steps of the simulation used to identify the optimal tax rules.   
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This means that the social planner uses the same basic functional form for measuring individual well-
being in terms of consumption and leisure as is used for the systematic part of the utility functions. 
Moreover, by dividing the couple income by the square root of 2 we transform couples into single 
individual households. The next problem is to assess the value of the parameters of the common utility 
function for individuals on the basis of the observed leisure and income data where individual incomes 27 
are defined by (4.2). Since the observed chosen combinations of leisure and income depend on the 
availability of various job opportunities, we use expression (2.4), where the systematic part of the 
utility function (v) is replaced by the individual welfare function (V) defined by (4.1), as a basis for 
estimating the parameters of V. Table 4.1 displays the parameter estimates.  
Table 4.1. Estimates of the parameters of the welfare function for individuals 20 – 62 years old, 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Stand.dev. 
Income after tax (y)       
  1 g   -0.649  0.086   
 
2 g   3.026  0.138 
Leisure (L)       
 
3 g   -12.262  0.556 
 
4 g   0.045  0.011 
 
  A different way to circumvent the interpersonal comparability problem consists in avoiding 
interpersonal comparisons altogether and basing the social evaluation exclusively on ordinal 
comparisons. We provide an example of this method in Table 5.6, where we presents the number of 
“winners” under the optimal tax rules. This is just an illustration, whereas a proper application of the 
ordinal criterion would require defining the optimal tax in a different way; for example the rule that 
maximizes the number of winners.  
4.3. Social Welfare Functions 
The informational structure of the individual welfare functions (common utility function) defined by 
(4.1) allows comparison of welfare gains and losses of different individuals due to a policy change. 
When evaluating the distribution of individual welfare effects of a tax system and/or a tax reform it is 
required to summarize the gains and losses by a social welfare function. The simplest welfare function 
is the one that adds up the comparable welfare gains over individuals. The objection to the linear 
additive welfare function is that the individuals are given equal welfare weights, independent of 
whether they are poor or rich. Concern for distributive justice requires, however, that poor individuals 
are assigned larger welfare weights than rich individuals. This structure is captured by the following 
family of rank-dependent welfare functions
12, 
                                                      
12 Several other authors have discussed rationales for rank-dependent measures of inequality and social welfare, see e.g. Sen 
(1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992) 





( ) ( ) , 1,2,..., W p t F t dt i
- = = ∫  
where F
-1 is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the individual welfare levels V 
with mean m, and  ( ) p t  is a positive weight-function defined on the unit interval. The social welfare 
functions (4.3) can be given a similar normative justification as it is made for the “expected utility” 
social welfare functions introduced by Atkinson (1970). Given suitable continuity and dominance 
assumptions for the preference ordering ≻ defined on the family of income distributions F, Yaari 
(1988, 1989) demonstrated that the following axiom, 
 
Axiom (Dual independence). Let F1, F2 and F3 be members of F and let  [ ] 0,1 a Î  Then  1 2 F F ≻  implies 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 2 3 (1 ) (1 ) F F F F a a a a
- - - - - - + - + - ≻ , 
 
characterizes the family of rank-dependent measures of social welfare functions (4.3)  where  ( ) p t  is a 
positive non-decreasing function of t. We refer to Yaari (1987, 1988) for a discussion of the difference 
between the dual independence axiom and the conventional independence axiom that justifies the 
“expected utility” social welfare functions.  
 
 In this paper we use the following specification of ( ) p t ,  
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Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by the social welfare function Wi (associated with ( ) i p t ) 
decreases with increasing i. As  , i i W ® ¥  approaches inequality neutrality and coincides with the 
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It follows by straightforward calculations that  i W m £  for all i and that Wi is equal to the mean  m  for 
finite i if and only if F is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wi can be interpreted as the equally 29 
distributed individual welfare level. As recognized by Yaari (1988) this property suggests that Ci, 
defined by  






= - =  
can be used as a summary measure of inequality and moreover can be proved to be a member of the 
“illfare-ranked single-series Ginis” class introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980)
13. Thus, as 
was recognized by Ebert (1987) the justification of the social welfare function  ( ) 1 i i W C m = -  can also 
be made in terms of a value judgement of the trade-off between the mean and (in)equality in the 
distribution of welfare.  
  As noted by Aaberge (2000, 2007), C1 is actually equivalent to a measure of inequality that 
was proposed by Bonferroni (1930), whilst C2 is the Gini coefficient. As demonstrated by Aaberge 
(2000, 2007) C1 exhibits strong downside inequality aversion and is particularly sensitive to changes 
that concern the poor part of the population, whilst C2 normally pays more attention to changes that 
take place in the middle part of the income distribution. The C3-coefficient exhibits upside inequality 
aversion and is thus particularly sensitive to changes that occur in the upper part of the income 
distribution. Due to the close relationship between C1, C2 and C3 Aaberge (2007) proposed to treat 
them as a group and call them Gini's Nuclear Family of inequality measures. 
  To ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion profiles exhibited by W1, W2, W3 and W¥ 
Table 4.2 provides ratios of the corresponding weights – as defined by (4.4) – of the median individual 
and the 1 per cent poorest, the 5 per cent poorest, the 30 per cent poorest and the 5 per cent richest 
individual for different social welfare criteria. As can be observed from the weight profiles provided 
by Table 4.2 W1 will be particular sensitive to changes in policies that affect the welfare of the poor, 
whereas the inequality aversion profile of W3 is rather moderate and W¥ exhibits neutrality with 
respect to inequality. 
Table 4.2. Distributional weight profiles of four different social welfare functions  




W3  W¥  
(Utilitarian) 
p(.01)/p(.5)  6.64  1.98  1,33  1 
p(.05)/p(.5)  4,32  1,90  1,33  1 
p(.30)/p(.5)  1,74  1,40  1,21  1 
p(.95)/p(.5)  0,07  0,10  0,13  1 
                                                       
13 Note that Aaberge (2001) provides an axiomatic justification for using the Ck – measures as criteria for ranking Lorenz 
curves. 30 
4.4. The Optimal Taxation Problem 
The optimal taxation problem considered in this exercise can be formulated as follows:  
(4.7)   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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( ) ( )
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1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
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For the sake of simplicity of exposition the expression (4.7) assumes that the N households are single 
individuals, while in fact we consider both couples and singles. 
 All the variables are the same as those appearing in expression (2.1) in Section 2 and M is the current 
(1994) total net tax revenue.  The function  ( , ; ) n f wh I J , - which transforms gross incomes (wh, I) into 
net available income c , denotes a class of tax rules defined up to a vector of parameters J . As we will 
explain in Section 5, we will consider a class of piecewise-linear tax rules with a lump-sum tax or 
transfer. Therefore the parameters will be the amount of the lump-sum tax or transfers, the lower and 
upper limits of the tax brackets and the marginal tax rates applied to the tax brackets. Household n 
maximizes her own utility given the tax rule  ( , ; ) i f wh I J by choosing the “job” ( ) , , , n n n n c h s j . Taking 
the individual utility-maximizing choices into account as a constraint (i.e. the incentive-compatibility 
constraint),, the social planner searches for the tax rule – i.e. the parameter vector J – that maximizes 
the social welfare function W, subject to the constraint that the total net tax revenue must be at least as 
large as M. The social welfare function W takes as arguments the evaluations – according to the 
common utility function V – of the N chosen “jobs”. Given the very flexible and general specifications 
adopted for the random utility functions and the opportunity sets, problem (4.7) cannot be solved 
analytically. The maximization of W is performed by a global maximization procedure that efficiently 
scans the parameter space. At each run of the iterative procedure, the maximization of the individual 
utility function is simulated by the microeconometric model described in Section 2  
The search for the optimal tax rule is limited to the class of piecewise-linear rules, with five brackets: 
(4.8) 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 3 2 2 3
1 1 2 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 3
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where  y is income after tax, Z is the sum of gross market income (earnings plus capital income) and 
taxable public transfers, T is a tax-free public transfer (positive or negative), E is the exemption level, 
( ) 1 2 3 4 , , , t t t t  are the marginal tax rates applied to the four brackets of income above the exemption 
level,  1 Z  is the upper limit of the first bracket,  2 Z is the upper limit of the second bracket,  3 Z  is the 
upper limit of the third bracket and T  is a lump-sum that can be positive (i.e. a lump-sum transfer) or 
negative (i.e. a lump-sum tax). Thus, each particular tax rule is characterized by the nine parameters: 
E ,  1 t ,  2 t ,  3 t ,  4 t ,  1 Z ,  2 Z , 3 Z and T. In the exercise presented hereafter the top marginal tax rate is 
constrained to be  4 0 75 . . t £
14 
  The tax rule specified by (4.8) replaces the current rule as of 1994, which is described by the 
example of Table 4.3 and also belongs to the class of piece-wise linear tax rules,
15 where M denotes 
gross earnings. In this paper we focus on the effect of the tax system on labour supply. Thus, 
individuals receiving income support related to health or disability (which represents a major part of 
welfare policies) are not included in the sample that forms the basis of this study. The most important 
welfare policies addressed to the employed in 1994 were tax-free transfers related to children. These 
are kept unchanged.  
Table 4.3.  Current tax rule in Norway as of 1994 for singles without children and couples 
without children and with two wage earners 
Gross earnings (NOK 1994)  Tax 
(0 – 17000)  0 
(17000 – 24709)  0.25M - 4250 
(24709 – 28250)  0.078M   
(28250 – 140500)  0.302M - 6328 
(140500 – 208000)  0.358M  - 14196 
(208000 – 234500)  0.453M - 33956 
(234500 – )  0.495M - 43804 
 
 
When using the random utility model specified in Section 2 to design optimal taxes it is important to 
stress that household members choose among jobs (characterized by h, w and other characteristics s 
and j), not just among different values of h. Theoretical optimal taxation models typically consider 
                                                       
14 This upper limit is imposed for the sake of realism, since it is the highest top marginal tax rate on personal income reached 
in Norway in the period 1980 – 2000. 
15 Taxes include the part of social security contributions paid by the employee. 32 
effort as the agents’ choice variable. Effort does not coincide with hours of work; it might include 
searching for jobs of better quality etc. On the other hand, empirical models of labour supply used for 
tax reform evaluations have traditionally considered hours of work as the sole choice variable, 
implicitly equating hours of work and effort. An exception is provided by Bourguignon and Spadaro 
(2005), who under rather special assumptions are able to impute to each agent an effort value. In our 
model we do not strictly identify effort as hours of work, since the agent chooses a package that 
includes not only hours but also wage rates and other observed and unobserved job characteristics. A 
related concept – taxable income – has been used by Feldstein (1995) and Gruber and Saez (2002). 
The idea is that in evaluating the effects of changes in taxes one should not just look at hours of work 
(and participation), since households’ response include many other dimensions (effort, wage rates, job 
content etc.). At least part of these multi-dimensional responses is reflected in taxable income. Our 
model is consistent with this argument, since households – as a response to a change in the tax system 
– might choose a new job that differs from the previous one not only with respect to hours of work but 
also with respect to the wage rate and other job characteristics.  
 
 
  The identification of the optimal tax rules consists of four steps: 
1.  First, for each household we simulate the opportunity set, which contains the observed job 
plus 199 market and non-market alternatives drawn from the estimated p-densities defined in 
Section 2.2.1. -  expressions (2.5) – 2.13).  Second, for each household and each alternative in 
the opportunity set we draw a value e from the Type III extreme value distribution. Next, the 
new tax rule is applied to individual earners’ gross incomes in order to obtain disposable 
incomes (income after tax) corresponding to each alternative in the choice set. For each 
household a new choice (h,w,s), in view of a new tax rule,  is given by the alternative that 
maximizes the household-specific utility functions U defined by (2.2) where v is defined by 
(2.14) for singles and by (2.18) for couples . 
2.  To each decision maker (wife or husband) an equivalent income (y) is imputed. The equivalent 
income is computed as total disposable household income (c) divided by the square root of the 
number of household members. The purpose of this procedure is to convert the distribution of 
incomes (c) across heterogeneous families into a distribution of (equivalent) incomes (y) 
across adult individuals.  
3.  As a result of the previous steps, we now have for each individual a simulated pair (y, h). As 
explained in  Section 4.2, we  compute the individual welfare levels by applying to the chosen 
(y, h) the individual welfare (common utility) function (4.1).  33 
4.  We then compute  i W   for  1,2,3 i =  and ¥. 
Optimization is performed by iterating the steps 1- 4 in order to find the tax rule from the class (4.8) 
that produces the highest value of  i W   for each value of i, under the constraint of constant total tax 
revenue.
16 Colombino et al. (2008), Colombino (2009) and Blundell and Shephard (2009) use a 
different method, where the maximum utility attained under a given tax-transfer rule is not found by 
simulation but it is instead measured by the expected maximum utility (McFadden 1978).   
 
5.  The optimal tax-transfer schedules 
  The results of our exercise are reported in Tables 5.1 - 5.5.  
 
Table 5.1   Optimal tax rules according to alternative social welfare criteria
(*). ( 4 t constrained 
to be £ 0.75 ) 
  Social welfare function 




W3  W¥  
(Utilitarian) 
1 t   0.06  0.16  0.21  0.23 
2 t   0.30  0.26  0.25  0.28 
3 t   0.39  0.38  0.37  0.33 
4 t   0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
T  -11 900  -6 000  -2 800   -2 800 
E  29 000  21 000  23 000  24 000 
1 Z   120 000  130 000  140 000  210 000 
2 Z   220 000  230 000  230 000  280 000 
3 Z   720 000  710 000  710 000  740 000 
(*) E, T, 1 Z ,  2 Z and  3 Z are measured in thousands of 1994 NOK  
 
Table 5.1 displays the optimal tax systems from the optimization exercise. In order to  ease the 
comparability of the behavioural responses to the 1994 tax system and the various optimal tax systems 
                                                      
16 The optimal tax-transfer parameters are determined by an iterative grid-search procedure developed by Tom Wennemo at 
the Research Department of Statistics Norway. Each optimization requires the evaluation of approximately 200 000 tax-
transfer rules.  34 
we report proportions of individuals by family status in specific tax income brackets in Table 5.2. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide additional information of the behavioural implications of the optimal tax 
rules. Table 5.5 displays the percentages of winners under the optimal rule by income deciles of the 
1994 income distribution.   
a)  Under any social welfare function, the marginal tax rates are continuously increasing for all 
level of income. The lump-sum transfer turns out to be a (modest) tax, which implies a 
reduction of the universal transfers that characterize the current system (essentially child 
benefits). Altogether then the optimal tax-transfer rule envisages a universal transfer and a 
sequence of continuously increasing marginal tax rates starting from 0 up to 75%. This picture 
is in sharp contrast with most of the results obtained by the numerical exercises based on 
Mirrlees’s optimal tax formulas. The typical outcome of those exercises envisages a lump-sum 
transfer which is progressively taxed away by very high marginal and decreasing tax rates on 
lower incomes (i.e. a negative income tax mechanism); after the income level where the 
transfer is exhausted the marginal tax rates remains constant or slightly increasing.
17 Recent 
papers by Tuomala (2006, 2008) show however that these results are essentially forced by the 
restrictive assumption typically made upon preferences, elasticities and distribution of 
productivities (or wage rates). Interestingly, when Tuomala (2008) adopts a more flexible 
specification of the utility function he gets results that are qualitatively closer to those found in 
this paper.  
b)  The tables show that the more egalitarian the criterion is, the more progressive is the optimal 
tax rule. For example the optimal rule according to Bonferroni is more progressive than the 
optimal rule according to Gini, which in turn is more progressive than the optimal utilitarian 
rule. The optimal rule according to the utilitarian criterion turns out to be the closest one to the 
current (1994) rule. 
c)  All the optimal rules imply a higher income after tax for most levels of gross income. In other 
words, the optimal rules are able to extract the same total tax revenue from a larger total gross 
income (i.e. applying a lower average tax rate). The result is due to a sufficiently high labour 
supply response estimated and accounted for by the model.  The optimal rules induce (some 
of) the households to move to alternatives with longer hours and/or higher wages.  Second, the 
optimal marginal tax rates applied to all incomes except those belonging to the highest income 
bracket are lower than the ones implied by the current tax rule. This result provides a 
                                                      
17 The numerical simulations reported in Saez (2001) produce also an optimal tax-transfer rule envisaging a negative income 
tax mechanism coupled with more or less constant marginal tax rates. Another contribution by Saez (2002) – that attributes a 
crucial role to the relative magnitude of the elasticities at the extensive margin and at the intensive margin – has stimulated 
applications where mechanisms like in-work benefits turn out to be superior to the negative income tax (e.g. Immervoll et al. 
2007). 35 
controversial perspective in view of the tax reforms implemented in many developed countries 
during the last decades. In most cases those reforms embodied the idea of improving 
efficiency and labour supply incentives through a lower average tax rate and lower marginal 
tax rates on the highest incomes.
18 Our optimal tax computations give support to the first part 
(lowering the average tax rate), much less to the second; on the contrary our results suggest 
that a lower average tax rate should be obtained by lowering the marginal tax rates particularly 
on low and average income brackets
19. Clearly the pattern of elasticities – sharply decreasing 
with respect to income – illustrated in Table 3.1 contributes to the profile of the optimal 
marginal tax rates.  
d)  Table 5.4 shows that the strongest labour supply response comes from households in the lower 
income deciles, who are those who show a more elastic labour supply (Section 3). Among the 
couples, while the wife receives a stronger incentive to work under the Bonferroni regime than 
under the Utilitarian regime, the opposite is the case for the husband. This happens because 
the wife has on average lower earnings than the husband and the more relevant tax brackets 
for her are the lower ones, those where the Bonferroni regime imposes much lower marginal 
tax rates than the Utilitarian regime (and than the current regime). On the other hand, the 
Utilitarian regime is especially favourable (also compared to the current regime) for those who 
decide to locate themselves in high tax brackets, where husbands are more likely to be found. 
The implication is that a more egalitarian criterion also involves stronger work incentives for 
married women (and especially those in the lower income deciles), and therefore also a more 
egalitarian inter-gender distribution of income.  
e)  Table 5.5 shows the percentage of winners under the optimal rules, by marital status, gender 
and household income decile under the current 1994 rule. An individual is defined as a winner 
if her/his welfare is higher under the new tax rule than under the current 1994 rule. All the 
optimal rules would largely “win the referendum” against the current rule, since they all imply 
a strong majority of winners. The percentage of winners, however, varies substantially across 
the different subgroups and especially across income deciles. Singles women in the IX and X 
income deciles are the only ones who would “vote against” all the optimal tax rules. The 
current (1994) tax system provides important deductions for children. It appears that these 
deductions favour in particular the group of relatively well-off single women with children. 
                                                      
18 For example Blundell (1996) reports that during the 80’s and early 90’s in some countries the top marginal tax rates were 
cut from 70-80% down to about 40-50%. On these issues the discussion in Røed and Strøm (2001) is especially relevant.  
19 A second important difference between our exercise and the implemented reforms referred to in the main text, is that those 
reforms typically envisaged a reduction of the total tax revenue together with the reduction in the average tax rate, while in 
our simulations we keep the total tax revenue unchanged.  36 
The deductions are removed in the class of tax-transfer rule we optimize upon. As a 
consequence, a majority of those women loose under the optimal rules. 
f)  The lump-sum  T turns out to be a tax rather than a transfer. The lump-sum tax is relatively 
modest for social welfare functions where i > 2 (when T would cover 5.2% of the total net tax 
revenue), but more significant for the Gini and Bonferroni welfare criteria (in the Bonferroni 
case T would cover 22% of the total net tax revenue). This result can be explained by the fact 
that individuals/couples with small and medium high incomes are particularly sensitive to 
changes in marginal taxes (see Table 3.1). Thus marginal tax rates on low and average 
incomes are kept low both for minimizing distortions and for fulfilling distributive goals. 
However, since the total net tax revenue must be kept unchanged and the top marginal tax rate 
must not exceed 75%, the optimal tax rule envisages a universal lump-sum tax. A possible 
practical implementation close to a lump-sum tax might be represented by a tax on wealth or 
on property (e.g. on owner-occupied houses). According to this interpretation, the optimal tax 
rules would imply – with respect to the 1994 rule – a lower taxation on earnings 
complemented by a property tax.   37 
 
  Table 5.2 Proportion of individuals by income intervals
(*) under different tax systems. Per cent  
  Proportions located in various gross income segments 
Income intervals  1994 tax system 
  Couples (Males)  Couples (Females)  Single Males  Single Females 
0 –30 000  4.7   16.2   0.0   0.0  
30 000 – 130 000  11.0   33.2   25.8  24.4  
130 000 – 230 000  30.8   34.9   40.9  51.2  
230 000 – 730 000  51.6   15.6   33.0  24.4  
730 000 ->  1.9   0.1   0.3   0.0  
         
    W1 – optimal tax system      
0 –30 000  2.6   10.6   0.0   0.0  
30 000 – 130 000  9.7   32.8   22.0   20.3  
130 000 – 230 000  30.2  38.8   40.9   52.6  
230 000 – 730 000  55.9  17.7   36.8   27.1  
730 000 ->  1.6   0.1   0.3   0.0  
              
  W2 – optimal tax system      
0 –30 000  3.1  12.1   0.0   0.0  
30 000 – 130 000  8.8   31.9   21.6   18.6  
130 000 – 230 000  28.9   38.0   41.2   54.0  
230 000 – 730 000  57.5   17.9   36.8   27.5  
730 000 ->  1.7   0.1   0.3   0.0  
          
  W3 – optimal tax system 
0 –30 000  3.4   13.3   0.0   0.0  
30 000 – 130 000  8.7   31.9   21.3   18.9  
130 000 – 230 000  28.0   36.8   41.2   53.6  
230 000 – 730 000  58.2   17.9   37.1   27.5  
730 000 ->  1.7   0.1   0.3   0.0  
          
  W¥ - optimal tax system 
0 –30 000  3.3   14.0  0.0   0.0  
30 000 – 130 000  8.0   31.6   21.0   182  
130 000 – 230 000  26.0   36.2   39.9   51.9  
230 000 – 730 000  60.9   18.0   38.8   29.9  
730 000 ->  1.8   0.2   0.3   0.0  
(*) The income intervals are the optimal income brackets in the W2 - optimal tax rule 
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Table 5..3   Percentage changes in participation rates, annual hours of work and disposable 
income under the optimal tax rules  
    Social welfare function 











Participation rates  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3 
Annual hours  4.8  5.0  5.0  6.2 
Disposable income  10.0  10.2  10.2  12.4 
            
Single 
females 
Participation rates  4.4  5.2  4.8  5.2 
Annual hours  6.3  7.9  7.9  9.7 
Disposable income  4.5  5.3  4.9  7.1 
            
Couples 
Participation rates, M  2.7  2.3  2.1  2.9 
Participation rates, F  5.4  4.1  2.8  2.6 
Annual hours, M  6.2  6.7  6.8  9.9 
Annual hours, F  10.3  8.9  6.9  6.5 
Disposable income  9.5  10.3  10.2  13.7 
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Table 5.4   Percentage changes in labour supply (total hours) by household income decile under 
the optimal tax rules  
    Social welfare function 









  Income decile under the 1994 system                 







I  60.5  71.7  57.3  71.7  57.3  64.7  62.8  76.1 
II  18.6  17.9  18.6  29.3  20.3  29.3  24.0  29.3 
III-VIII  0.7  3.0  1.2  4.5  1.1  4.9  1.7  7.0 
IX  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.6  0.7 
X  1.3  0.0  1.3  0.0  1.3  0.0  1.3  0.0 
All  4.8  6.3  5.0  7.9  5.0  7.9  6.2  9.7 







I  50.6  72.6  45.0  61.9  40.5  51.9  49.6  59.7 
II  23.6  22.7  24.7  22.3  24.2  22.2  34.7  23.1 
III-VIII  2.7  7.7  3.8  6.3  4.5  3.9  7.1  2.7 
IX  0.7  0.5  0.7  1.0  0.7  0.5  1.2  -0.3 
X  -2.5  -1.3  -1.8  -1.6  -1.8  -0.8  -0.9  -0.4 
All  6.2  10.3  6.7  8.9  6.8  6.9  9.9  6.5 
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Table 5.5. Percentage of winners under optimal tax rules  
   
Social welfare function 
    W1 
(Bonferroni) 
W2 





























I  79  79  66  79  79  76  62  72 
II  66  59  59  59  55  59  52  48 
III-VIII  85  67  85  68  80  68  75  66 
IX  79  45  83  45  83  45  83  48 
X  72  34  79  38  79  38  86  41 
All  80  62  79  63  78  63  74  60 




I  61  63  61  63  60  62  56  60 
II  70  71  68  68  70  70  68  70 
III-VIII  82  83  83  85  83  86  82  86 
IX  82  83  86  88  87  88  88  91 
X  74  72  75  74  75  74  78  77 
All  78  79  79  80  79  81  78  82 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have performed an exercise in designing optimal income taxes that – differently from what is 
typically done in the literature – does not rely on a priori theoretical optimal taxation results, but 
instead employs a microeconometric model of labour supply in order to maximize a social welfare 
function with respect to a parametrically defined income tax rule. Modern microeconometric models 
of labour supply are based on very general and flexible assumptions. They can accommodate many 
realistic features such as general structures of heterogeneous preferences, simultaneous decisions of 
household members, non-unitary mechanisms of household decisions, complicated (non-convex, non 
continuous, non-differentiable etc.) constraints and opportunity sets, multidimensional heterogeneity 
of both households and jobs,  quantitative constraints etc. It is simply not feasible (at least so far) to 
obtain analytical solutions for the optimal income taxation problem in such environments. Yet those 
features are very relevant and important especially in view of evaluating or designing reforms. 
Analytical solutions remain indispensable for understanding the grammar of the problem and for 
suggesting promising classes of tax-transfer systems that can then be more deeply investigated with 41 
the microeconometric model. The philosophy inspiring this approach is similar to the one adopted 
since long ago in engineering and recently and successfully also in other applications of mechanism 
design (auctions, negotiation procedures, matching markets etc.) where analytical solutions are 
complemented by computational simulations or experiments that account for a host of realistic 
features that cannot be included in the theoretical model.
20  
The microeconometric model we develop in this paper can be considered as an extension of the 
standard multinomial logit model, and is designed to allow for a detailed description of complex 
choice sets and budget constraints. This model differs from the traditional models of labor supply in 
several respects. First, it accounts for observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and 
allows for constraints in the choice of hours of work. Second, it includes both single person 
households and married/cohabiting couples and allows for simultaneous treatment of both spouses 
choices. Third, the model allows for an exact representation of income taxes. The model, which 
contains 78 parameters that capture the heterogeneity in preferences as well as in opportunities among 
households and individuals, is estimated with Norwegian micro data from 1995. The estimated model 
is used to simulate the choices made by single individuals and couples for any given tax-transfer rule. 
Those choices are therefore generated by preferences and opportunities that vary across the decision 
units. We identify optimal tax rules – within a class of 9-parameter piece-wise linear rules - by 
iteratively running the model until the social welfare function is maximized under the constraint of 
keeping constant the total net tax revenue. 
  We focus on the profile of the marginal tax rates and keep fixed the current (1994) system of 
transfers, income support and social assistance policies, but allow for a lump-sum that can be positive 
(i.e. a transfer) or negative (i.e. a tax). We explore a variety of different social welfare criteria. The 
marginal tax rates always turn out to be monotonically increasing with income. More egalitarian social 
welfare functions tend to imply more progressive tax rules. Irrespective of the social welfare criterion 
used, the top optimal marginal tax rate always turns out to be 75 per cent for sufficiently high gross 
income levels (approximately above 700 000 Norwegian Kroner (1994) »87 000 Euros), which 
concerns 1.8 per cent of the tax payers. All the optimal tax rules imply an average tax rate lower than 
the current 1994 one and imply – with respect to the current rule – lower marginal rates on low and/or 
average income levels and a higher marginal rate on sufficiently high income levels. The pattern of 
labour supply elasticities illustrated in Section 3 contributes to explaining the profile of the optimal tax 
rules. Our results are partially at odds with the tax reforms that took place in many countries during 
the last decades. While those reforms embodied the idea of lowering average tax rates, the way to 
implement it has typically consisted in reducing the top marginal rates. Our results instead suggest 
                                                      
20 Roth (2002) provides a very inspired survey of this approach. 42 
lowering average tax rates by reducing marginal rates on low and average income levels and 
increasing marginal rates on very high income levels.                          
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